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Cryptographic schemes, key exchange, public key
Ted Hurley∗
Abstract
General cryptographic schemes are presented where keys can be one-time or ephemeral. Processes
for key exchange are derived. Public key cryptographic schemes based on the new systems are
established. Authentication and signature schemes are easy to implement. The schemes may be
integrated with error-correcting coding schemes so that encryption/coding and decryption/decoding
may be done simultaneously.
1 Introduction
This paper introduces cryptographic systems based on operations with randomly chosen vectors, matrices
and group ring elements. Keys used may be one-time session keys or ephemeral; as they are easily
constructed they may be changed if necessary for each transaction or series of transactions. Key exchange
methods are derived. Public key cryptographic schemes based on the new systems are introduced. It
is straightforward to include authentication, signature and ‘person-in-middle’ interference prevention
methods based on the schemes. Encryption may be incorporated with error-correcting codes so that
encryption/coding and decryption/decoding can be done simultaneously. A public-key scheme can be
altered and made private to an individual.
Large pools from which to randomly draw the keys are available; using for example systems of size
101 over Zp there are of the order of p
100 different elements from which to choose in the construction of
a key.
Features
• Encryption and decryption keys are easy to construct and can be chosen for a one-time session or
series of transactions.
• Key exchange schemes are derived.
• Public key cryptographic schemes are developed. These can be altered for private communication
and messages then authenticated.
• Authentication, signature and ‘person-in-middle’ interference prevention methods are provided.
• Encryption and error-correction coding may be integrated into one system. Coding and encryption
can complement one another.
When a system is used for one-time session then three transmissions are necessary. A key exchange
also requires three transmissions but once a key has been exchanged each transaction naturally then
requires just the one transmission.
Layout
The layout of the paper is as follows:
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1. Details on various theory required for the constructions are given in section 8 and may be consulted
as required. Here also various systems and schemes within which the constructions may be realised
are outlined.
2. General encryption methods are introduced in section 2.
3. Key exchange methods are laid out in section 3.
4. Public key encryption methods are given in section 4.
5. Methods to include error-correcting with the cryptography is presented in section 5.
6. Multiple design methods are presented in section 6.
7. Section 7 discusses authentication, signature and ‘person-in-middle’ solutions.
Basic references for cryptography include [3], [4], [9]. The first two in particular contain much of the
algebra required and further basic algebraic material may be obtained in [10].
2 Encrypt message
2.1 General Schemes
Here Rn×n denotes the ring of n× n matrices, and R
n is the ring of vectors of length n, over a ring R.
RG denotes the group ring of the group G over the ring R; for details on general properties of group
rings see [10]. The R is usually a field and is often then denoted by F . For details on group ring matrices
see for example [5]; the set-up and main properties of these are given in section 8.3. They may also
be referred to as RG-matrices when the group ring in question is specified and are obtained from the
embeddings of a group rings into rings of matrices; they include such matrices as circulant matrices,
circulant of circulant matrices and similar such.
An RG-matrix, which is of size |G|×|G|, is determined by its first row and is a matrix corresponding to
a group ring element, relative to a listing of the elements of G. Two RG-matrices obtained from the same
group ring RG (relative to the same listing) are said to be of the same type. The RG-matrices commute
if and only if G is commutative. Methods to randomly choose singular and non-singular matrices with
certain properties from a huge pool of such matrices are given in section 8.5.
Let x be a row vector with entries from R. Then the completion of x in RG (relevant to a particular
listing) is the RG-matrix with first row x. The rank of a vector, relative to its completion in a specified
group ring, is defined as the rank of its completion; this gives meaning to kernel of a vector relative to
its group ring completion.
The completion of the vector x is denoted by the corresponding capital letterX (without underlining).
For a ∈ RG its image in Rn×n under the embedding of RG into Rn×n is denoted by the corresponding
capital letter A. When x is a vector to be considered as an element of RG then also use X (without
underlining) to denote its image under this embedding.
The following Lemma is immediate.
Lemma 2.1 Suppose P,Q are RG-matrices with the same first row. Then P = Q.
Thus if x is a vector in Rn and A is an RG-matrix of size n×n then from Lemma 2.1 the completion
of xA in RG is XA where X is the completion of x in RG.
Let x be the data to be transmitted secretly from A(lice) to B(ob). The data x is arranged so that X
is singular with large kernel where X is the completion of x in same type of RG-matrix as A (the matrix
chosen by A below in 1.); details on how this can be arranged are given below in section 8.5. When X
is singular with large kernel then also CX,XC are singular with large kernel for any matrix C.
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2.1.1 General set-up
1. A chooses A, a non-singular group ring matrix, and transmits xA.
2. B chooses B non-singular and transmits BXA.
3. A transmits BX .
4. B works out B−1BX = X .
B need not in general be a group ring matrix and even if so it need not be of the same type as A. If B
is of the same type as A and X then only the first row of the matrices in 2. and 3. need be transmitted.
In 4. only the first row of B−1BX need be calculated as the first row of X give x. The inverses of
A,B should be easily obtainable; pools of matrices from which such matrices may be drawn are given in
section 8. When using matrices with certain structures such as RG-matrices the matrix multiplications
and vector-matrix multiplications may be performed by convolutional methods.
The matrices A,B here are as large as the vector of data x and chosen randomly. The data may also
be broken up and multiple vector design schemes implemented as shown in section 6.
Simplified schemes with commuting matrices are derived in the next section 2.1.2; these do not
necessarily need RG-matrices.
2.1.2 Commuting schemes
Suppose the large pool of matrices available commute with one another. In these cases simplified schemes
may be designed as follows.
Let x be data to be transmitted secretly from A(lice) to B(ob).
1. A chooses the matrix A non-singular and xA is transmitted.
2. B chooses the matrix B non-singular and transmits xAB.
3. A transmits xABA−1 = xB.
4. B applies B−1 to xB to get x.
Even when the matrices commute, the general scheme of 2.1.1 may still be used.
Schemes with commuting matrices may be achieved using group ring matrices derived from an abelian
group ring as for example circulant matrices or circulant of circulant matrices. Section 8.4 discusses types
of such matrices which may be used. When such group ring matrices are used the data is arranged so
that the group ring matrix formed using x as first row is singular with large kernel; how to arrange the
data in such a way is discussed later. The non-singular matrices are chosen so that the inverses are
immediate or straightforward to calculate.
When some matrices commute the data x may also be ‘protected’ at each end as follows:
1. A chooses A1, A2 non-singular and transmits A1XA2.
2. B chooses B1, B2 non-singular and transmits B1A1XA2B2. It is necessary that AiBi = BiAi for
i = 1, 2 but otherwise there are no commuting conditions.
3. A transmits B1XB2.
4. B works out X .
If all matrices commute, including X , then the system is the same as above, with A replaced by A1A2
and B replaced by B1B2.
3
3 Key exchange
A modification of the general scheme is now set up so that a process may be initiated whereby two
intended correspondents can exchange a secret encoder/decoder.
Let {x, y} be vectors so that {X,Y } are singular with large kernel and some combination of {X,Y }
or some combination of {X,Y } with a known element or elements is non-singular. Methods to randomly
choose such vectors {x, y} are developed in section 8 below.
1. A chooses A non-singular and x with large kernel and transmits xA.
2. B chooses B non-singular and transmits BXA.
3. A transmits BX . B now knows X . A can now repeat the process to get Y secretly to B. Or else:
(a) B chooses Y with large kernel and B1 non-singular so that a combination of {X,Y } with a
known element or known elements is non-singular and transmits B1Y .
(b) A transmits B1Y A.
(c) B transmits Y A.
4. Both A and B now have X,Y from which to form the encoding matrix for use between A and B.
When x, y are known, an RG-matrix may be formed from these using a different RG from that
used for the key exchange. Convolutional methods where appropriate as with group ring matrices may
be used for matrix and matrix-vector multiplications. It is sometimes the case that it is sufficient to
simply add on a known element or known elements to x + y to obtain an element whose completion is
non-singular. For example X + Y + 1 may be known to be non-singular in some systems, see section 8.
Knowing the added element(s) gives no information as x, y are known only to A,B. In section 8.6 it is
shown how to randomly choose {X,Y } each with large kernel so that a (linear) combination of {X,Y }
is non-singular and its inverse is easily constructed.
In cases X,Y may be chosen so that small powers of X,Y are zero. This ensures that kerX, kerY
are large, see Corollary 8.1 below, and then kerXC, kerCY, kerCX, kerY C are also large for any matrix
C.
When key has been exchanged between A and B, messages between them may then be encrypted
directly. When a key has been exchanged it is not necessary to arrange data to be transferred to have
large kernel. Messages may also then be encrypted and encoded together as shown later.
The data x, y may be protected on both sides when some matrices commute; in 1. above, A chooses
A1, A2 non-singular and x with large kernel and transmits A1XA2 to which B chooses B1, B2 where
AiBi = BiAi and transmits B1A1XA2B2 and process continues as above.
Key exchange with commuting matrices
When the matrices commute the schemes may be simplified as follows.
1. A chooses x, with large kernel, and A, non-singular, and transmits xA.
2. B chooses B1 non-singular and transmits xAB1.
3. A transmits xB1. At this stage B, and A, know x. A could proceed to transmit y secretly or else:
(a) B chooses y with large kernel and B2 non-singular and transmits yB2.
(b) A chooses A1 non-singular and transmits yB2A1.
(c) B transmits yA1B.
4. At this stage both A and B know x, y from which the combination is formed whose completion is
non-singular; this is used as key for transmission(s) between A and B.
4
Variations
Still using the main ideas, it is clear that many variations on the above schemes can be developed. For
example the x asX can be ‘protected’ on both sides by transmitting A1XA2 at 1. above and B1A1XA2B2
at 2. where AiBi = BiAi for i = 1, 2; similarly the y can be ‘protected’ on both sides. Methods using
series of vectors {x1, x2, . . . , xr} and {y1, y2, . . . , yr} are presented in section 6.2.
4 Public key
Public key cryptographic methods may be designed by choosing vectors with large kernels from a large
pool such that a linear combination of these is non-singular. The participant A constructs a public key
as follows.
1. A chooses vectors {x, y} such that their completions {X,Y } have large kernels and such that a
linear combination of {X,Y } is non-singular.
2. A chooses non-singular matrices {A1, A2} and works out {XA1, Y A2}.
3. A has public key (XA1, Y A2) and private key (X,Y,A1, A2).
Suppose now B wishes to communicate z to A.
1. B transmits (zXA1, zY A2).
2. A works out (zX, zY ) and uses the combination f(X,Y ) of X,Y to work out zf(X,Y ) where
f(X,Y ) is non-singular; from this z may be worked out by A.
Methods to randomly choose such {x, y} are shown in section 8.6 and methods to randomly choose
such {A1, A2} appear in various parts of section 8.
The x, y may be ‘protected’ on both sides as follows: Step 2. is replaced by: A chooses {A1, A2, A3, A4}
and works out (A1XA2, A3Y A4); A then has public key (A1XA2, A3Y A4) and private key
(X,Y,A1, A2, A3, A4). Choosing A1 from a set of commuting RG-matrices and completing the data z to
Z relative to RG enables ZX to be recovered by A from ZA1XA2 and similarly ZY may be recovered
by choosing A3 from a set of commuting RG1-matrices where it’s not necessary that G = G1.
Details on orthogonal sets of idempotents are given in section 8.6. Here we outline a method of
public key construction using full complete orthogonal sets of idempotents. Let {E0, E1, . . . , En−1} be
an complete orthogonal set of idempotents in Fn×n. Thus here each Ei has rank 1 (but this is not
necessary in general, see section 8.6).
1. A chooses J ⊂ I with |J | approximately half of |I| = n and constructs X =
∑
j∈J αjEj , Y =∑
j∈(I−J) βjEj with αj 6= 0, βj 6= 0. (Here rankX = |J |, rankY = |I − J |. It is enough to choose
J so that both X,Y have large kernel.)
2. A chooses {A1, A2} non-singular and calculates {XA1, Y A2}.
3. A has public key (XA1, Y A2) and private key (X,Y,A1, A2).
When B wishes to communicate z to A, the process is as follows.
1. B transmits (zXA1, zY A2).
2. A works out (zX, zY ) and then z(X + Y ). Now X + Y is invertible and its inverse is easy to
calculate, by Lemma 8.5, and A works out z.
For each n there are many different complete orthogonal sets of idempotents in Fn×n. It is not necessary
that the particular complete orthogonal set used by A in constructing her public key be known to the
world so in fact an additional step before step 1. could be:
0. A chooses a complete orthogonal set of idempotents {E0, E1, . . . , En−1}.
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Convolutional methods where appropriate may be used for matrix and vector-by-matrix multiplica-
tions. The public keys may be changed from time to time. Errors (zXA1 + α, zY A2 + β) with α 6= 0
or β 6= 0 in transmitting (zXA1, zY A2) are easily detected unless α = γXA1 and β = γY A2 which is
extremely unlikely. This does not prevent an intruder from trying to falsify a message but a method to
prevent this is given in section 4.1 below.
4.1 From public to private
Suppose now A has public key (xA1, yA2). This can be made into a private key for B with which
messages from B only to A may be received:
• B chooses {B1, B2} non-singular and transmits (B1XA1, B2Y A2).
• A chooses {AB1 , AB2} and transmits (B1XAB1 , B2Y AB2).
• B has key (XAB1 , Y AB2) with which to send messages to A.
Some simplification is possible when matrices commute.
• B chooses {B1, B2} non-singular and transmits (xA1B1, yA2B2).
• A chooses {AB1 , AB2} and transmits (xAB1 , yAB2).
• B has (private) key (xAB1 , yAB2) with which to send messages to A.
Suppose now B has key (xAB1 , yAB2) with which to send message to A. Using this key, B sends message
z to A. Then A can work out zXAB1 and check that message has not been interfered with; an intruder
would need to know XAB1 in order to change message that would not be discovered in a check.
4.2 Partial public key
It is useful at times, in particular for authentication and signature schemes, for a participant to make
public a ‘key’ of the form yB where y has large kernel and B is invertible. Now yB cannot be inverted
and so may not be used as a key itself. It could be used for a message authentication scheme or signature
scheme.
This can be made private to another particular user by methods similar to those used in section4.1.
Suppose B has published yB where y has large kernel and B is invertible where {y,B} are kept private.
• A chooses A and transmits AY B.
• B chooses BA and transmits AY BA.
• A uses yBA with B.
A simplification using commuting matrices may be initiated similar to section 4.1.
4.3 Multiple design for public key
In the above scheme, vectors {x, y} such that their completions {X,Y } have large kernels and such
that a linear combination of {X,Y } is non-singular are chosen. More generally vectors {x1, x2, . . . , xr}
such that their completions {X1, X2, . . . , Xr} have large kernels and such that a linear combination
of {X1, X2, . . . , Xr} is non-singular may be chosen. However this increases the amount of data to be
transmitted as each zXiAi needs to be transmitted. However again one of these could be laid aside
authentication; for example a triple of form (xA1, yA2.pA3) each with large kernel such that a linear
combination of {X,Y, P} is non-singular is used but xA1 = xAB is private for B only to be used as a
check; when the message z is worked out, zXAB is used as a message authentication check. An original
xA1 may be altered to xAB by methods similar to those in section 4.1.
6
5 Cryptography + error-correction
The cryptographic systems may be used simultaneously with error-correcting systems. A basic general
reference for coding theory is [2].
Let x1 be 1× r data to be transmitted securely (with encryption) and safely (with error coding) from
A to B. Let G be a generator r × n matrix of an error-correcting code and x = x1G. When matrices
don’t necessarily commute proceed as follows:
1. A works out x = x1G chooses A non-singular and transmits xA.
2. B chooses B non-singular and transmits BXA.
3. A transmits BX .
4. B calculates B−1BX = X to get x which may have errors in transmission. B decodes the obtained
x to get x1.
If using RG-matrices of the same type only the first row of matrices need be worked out.
In general it is shown in Proposition 8.2 that if G is the generator matrix of an (n, r) code which
has rank r and G is a zero-divisor code (as are cyclic and similar codes, see [8]) then the completion of
x = x1G has rank at most r and so dimker of the completion of x is ≥ (n− r).
When encryption/decryption matrices to be chosen commute the following simplified method may
be used:
1. A works out x = x1G, chooses A non-singular and transmits xA.
2. B chooses B non-singular and transmits xAB.
3. A transmits xB.
4. B works out x which may have errors in the transmissions and decodes to x1.
The code determined by G is an (n, r) code with rank r. When for example G is cyclic then G can be
taken as the first r rows of a circulant matrix which has rank r. Then the completion of x = x1G is a
circulant matrix of rank at most r. The kernel then of this completion is of dimension at least (n − r).
See section 8.8 for details on these aspects.
5.1 Key exchange with coding
Modify the methods of section 3 as follows to include error-correcting codes.
Let {x1, y1} be 1× r vectors so that {X1, Y1} are singular with large kernel and some combination of
{X1, Y1} with a known element or elements is non-singular. Methods for randomly being able to choose
such vectors {x1, y1} are discussed in section 8 below.
Let G,L be generator r × n matrices of (n, r) error-correcting codes.
1. A chooses A non-singular and x1 and transmits x1GA.
2. B chooses B and transmits BXA where X is completion of x = x1G.
3. A transmits BX .
4. B now knows x which may contain errors but is decoded to x1.
(a) B chooses B1 non-singular and y1 so that the completion of a combination of {x1, y1} with a
known element or known elements is non-singular and transmits B1Y where y = y1L.
(b) A chooses A and transmits B1Y A.
(c) B transmits Y A. A knows y with possible errors and decodes to y1.
5. Both A and B now have x1, y1 from which to form the encoding matrix as in section 3.
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6 Multiple vector design
The data to be transmitted is broken as (x1, x2, . . . , xr). The xi need not be of the same length and are
arranged so that the Xi are singular except for possibly a relatively very small number of these.
6.1 General schemes
Bi and Ai are group ring matrices and Xi and Ai are of the same type.
1. A chooses {A1, A2, . . . , Ar} non-singular and transmits (x1A1, x2A2, . . . , xrAr)
2. B chooses {B1, B2, . . . , Br} non-singular and transmits (B1X1A1, B2X2A2, . . . , BrXrAr).
3. A transmits (B1X1, B2X2, . . . , BrXr).
4. B reads (x1, x2, . . . , xr) as the first row of (X1, X2, . . . , Xr).
The matrices do not need to commute and Bi need not be of the same type as Ai, Xi. If Bi is of the
same type as Xi, Ai then only the first rows of the matrices need be transmitted in 2. 3. above. In these
cases convolution methods for multiplication may be used.
6.1.1 Schemes with some matrices commuting
Here we have matrices Ai, Bi with AiBi = BiAi for each i; it is not necessary that AiBj = BjAi for
i 6= j nor that AiAj = AjAi for any i, j.
1. A chooses {A1, A2, . . . , Ar} non-singular and transmits (x1A1, x2A2, . . . , xrAr)
2. B chooses {B1, B2, . . . , Br} non-singular and transmits (x1A1B1, x2A2B2, . . . , xrArBr).
3. A transmits (x1B1, x2B2, . . . , xrBr).
4. B reads (x1, x2, . . . , xr).
6.2 Key exchange with multiple vectors and matrices
Key exchange with multiple vector choices may be achieved as follows:
Let {x1, x2, . . . , xr} and {y1, y2, . . . , yr} be sets of vectors where for each i, xi has the same length as
yi; these are chosen randomly so that Xi, Yi are singular (except possibly for a relatively small number
of them) and some combination of Xi, Yi is non-singular or some combination of Xi, Yi with a known
element or known elements is non-singular.
1. A chooses {A1, A2, . . . , Ar} non-singular and (x1, x2, . . . , xr) and transmits (x1A1, x2A2, . . . , xrAr).
2. B chooses {B1, B2, . . . , Br} non-singular and transmits (B1X1A1, B2X2A2, . . . , BrXrAr).
3. A transmits (B1X1, B2X2, . . . , BrXr).
4. B now knows (X1, X2, . . . , Xr). A can now repeat the process to get (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yr) secretly to B.
Or else:
(a) B chooses (y1, y2, . . . , yr) so that a combination of Xi, Yi or a combination of Xi, Yi with a
known element or known elements is non-singular.
(b) B chooses {B′1, B
′
2, . . . , B
′
r} non-singular and transmits (B
′
1Y1, B
′
2Y2, . . . , B
′
rYr).
(c) A chooses {A′1, A
′
2, . . . , A
′
r} non-singular and transmits (B1Y1A
′
1, B2Y2A
′
2, . . . , BrYrA
′
r).
(d) B transmits (Y1A
′
1, Y2A
′
2, . . . , YrA
′
r).
5. Both A and B now have the Xi, Yi for each i from which to form the secret encryption matrices.
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6.3 Key exchange with multiple vectors and coding
Key exchange with multiple vector choices and coding may be achieved as follows:
Let {x1, x2, . . . , xr} and {y1, y2, . . . , yr} be sets of vectors where for each i, xi has the same length as
yi; these are chosen randomly so that their completions Xi, Yi are singular except possibly for a small
number of them and some combination of their completions is non-singular or some combination of the
completions with known elements are non-singular. Define xi = xiGi, yi = yiKi for appropriately sized
generator matrices Gi,Ki of error-correcting codes.
1. A chooses {A1, A2, . . . , Ar} non-singular and transmits (x1A1, x2A2, . . . , xrAr).
2. B chooses {B1, B2, . . . , Br} non-singular and transmits (B1X1A1, B2X2A2, . . . , BrXrAr).
3. A transmits (B1X1, B2X2, . . . , BrXr).
4. B now knows (x1, x2, . . . , xr) with possible errors and decodes this to (x1, x2, . . . , xr). A can now
repeat the process to get (y1, y2, . . . , yr) secretly to B. Or else:
(a) B chooses (y1, y2, . . . , yr) so that a combination of Xi, Yi or a combination of Xi, Yi with a
known element or elements is non-singular.
(b) B chooses {B′1, B
′
2, . . . , B
′
r} non-singular and transmits (B
′
1y1, B
′
2y2, . . . , B
′
ryr).
(c) A chooses {A′1, A
′
2, . . . , A
′
r} non-singular and transmits (B1Y1A
′
1, B2Y2A
′
2, . . . , BrYrA
′
r).
(d) B transmits (Y1A
′
1, Y2A
′
2, . . . , YrA
′
r). A then knows (y1, y2, . . . , yr) with possible errors and
decodes to y1, y2, . . . , yr).
5. Both A and B now have the xi, yi for each i from which to form the secret encryption matrices.
7 Who is there?
Authentication and/or signature methods may be set up in the usual way when key exchange and/or
public key schemes have been established. Section 4.1 shows how public key may in a unique way be
used to establish that message is actually emanating from a correspondent A; the constituents of the
public key for B are changed so the new key may be used only by a particular A.
Without using public key or key exchange one or both of the following may be requirements.
• In a message exchange from A to B it may be the case that a response from B is required. In
certain situations then A requires to know that no one else is responding pretending to be B.
(‘Person-in-middle’ problem.)
• B requires to know that message purporting to come from A is actually from A.
To prevent these ‘person-in-middle’ problems proceed as follows. Each person X must have a ‘key’ which
is of the form yXX where yX has large kernel. This must be known to and trusted by the person with
whom the contact is to be made but may be public. This is a ‘partial’ public key as discussed in section
4.2.
7.1 Prevent Eve pretending to be B
E(ve), an eavesdropper, looking in at the communications in section 2.1.1 or 2.1.2 can see xA and
pretends to be B. (S)he then applies E to get EXA in 2.1.1 or xAE in 2.1.2, which is then transmitted
to A who applies A−1 and gives back EX or xE to E who can then read off x.
A wants to communicate x secretly to B. As stated the key for B is constructed from a vector y and
a non-singular matrix B and only the product yB is known to A but it may be public. y should be
chosen so that its completion Y is singular and has large kernel. However yB is not a public key for B
in general as it does not have an inverse.
Use the convention that matrices A and A∗ for suffices ∗ are matrices chosen and applied by A(lice)
and B and B∗ are matrices chosen and applied by B(ob).
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7.1.1 With Commuting matrices
Suppose the matrices commute.
1. B chooses signature key yB which is revealed.
2. A chooses {A,A1} and sends out (xA, yBA1).
3. B chooses {B1, B2} and transmits (xAB1, yA1B2).
4. A works out (xB1, yB2) and transmits (xB1 − yB2).
5. B works out (x− yB2B
−1
1 ) and yB2B
−1
1 and adds the two to get x.
In fact for 5. yB2B
−1
1 can be worked out when B1, B2 are chosen at 3. . Now A never knows y in
this set-up so B may use the same yB in communicating with another.
At point 4. A knows yB2 and may use this it in further transactions from A to B avoiding some
transmissions at points 2. , 3. above. In a sense then when A knows yB2 it may be as a ‘key’ for
transmissions from A to B and may be used as a non-public signature of B for A only. Some simplification
can be initiated when B is not worried that A may find y.
7.1.2 With matrices which may not commute
Similar schemes using non-commuting matrices are developed as follows.
A is required to transmit x to B and make sure that an eavesdropper may not pretend to be B. The
matrices A∗ and B∗ need not be of the same type, that is, need not be formed from the same group ring.
1. B chooses y and B and circulates yB (keeping y and B secret).
2. A chooses A,A1 and transmits (xA,A1Y B).
3. B chooses B1, B2 and transmits (B1XA,A1Y B2)
4. A works out (B1X,Y B2) and transmits (B1X − Y B2).
5. B works out B−11 (B1X − Y B2) = X − B
−1
1 Y B2 and adds it to B
−1
1 Y B2, which may be worked
out previously, to get X .
At point 4. A knows Y B2 which can be used for further transactions from A to B.
Variations on the above are easily constructed and designed.
7.2 To be sure
Suppose now A communicate with B and B wishes to be sure that the message is from A.
7.2.1 Where from, commuting
Each participant X has yXX , where X is invertible. When RG-matrices are used the completion of yX
should be singular with large kernel. yX and X are kept secret.
1. A chooses A1 and transmits yAA1.
2. B chooses B1 and transmits yAA1B1.
3. A transmits yAAB1 and B checks this.
(At stage 2. B can work out yAAB1 for checking at 3.)˙
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7.2.2 Where from, non-commuting
Suppose A wishes to communicate with B and B wishes to be sure that the message is from A. Each
participant X publishes XYX , where X is invertible and YX is singular with large kernel. YX and X are
kept secret.
1. A chooses A1 and transmits A1YA.
2. B chooses B1 and transmits A1YAB1. (At this stage B can work out AYAB1.)
3. A transmits AYAB1 and B checks this.
7.3 Combined
The methods of 7.1, 7.2 may be combined as required or necessary. A wishes to communicate with B; A
requires that an eavesdropper may not pretend to be B and B requires a signature so that (s)he knows
the message is from A. The methods are fairly straightforward and details are omitted.
7.4 Multiple vector design: Prevention
The authentication, signature methods devised above may also be extended to multiple vector design.
We outline just one of the methods.
7.4.1 Prevent E pretending
It is required when A communicates with B that E may not reply to A succeeding in pretending to be
B.
1. B has a key (y1B1, y2B2, . . . , ysBr) which is revealed at a particular time and known and trusted
by A.
2. A sends out ((x1A1, x2A2, . . . , xrAr), (y1B1A
′
1, y2B2A
′
2, . . . , ysBrA
′
r)) where (x1, x2, . . . , xr) is the
data to be transmitted and the size of xi is the same as that of yi.
3. B chooses (B′1, B
′
2, . . . , B
′
r) and transmits ((x1A1B
′
1, x2A2B
′
2, . . . , xrArB
′
r), (y1A
′
1, y2A
′
2, . . . , yrA
′
r)).
4. A transmits (x1B
′
1, x2B
′
2, . . . , xrB
′
r)− (y1, y2, . . . , yr).
5. B works out (x1, x2, . . . , xr)−(y1B
′−1
1 , y2B
′−1
2 , . . . , yrB
′−1
r ) and adds this to (y1B
′−1
1 , y2B
′−1
2 , . . . , yrB
′−1
r ),
which has already been worked out, to get (x1, x2, . . . , xr).
7.5 Authentication, signature, + coding
Authentication and signature with coding may similarly be implemented. The details are omitted.
Basically first of all the data is encoded as x = x1G. Then when x is received with possible errors it is
decoded to x1.
8 Theory
8.1 Vector by matrix multiplication
Much is contained in the literature on vector-matrix/matrix-vector multiplication. The multiplication
can be very fast when the matrix has a structure as for example if the matrix is an RG-matrix; a circulant
matrix is such an example. Group ring matrices of the groups Cn, C
n
2 , C
n
p and in general abelian groups
are particularly suitable. Vector-matrix multiplication in these cases using fast Fourier transform or
Walsh-Hadamard fast transform (for FCnp ) can be done in 0(n logn) time.
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The multiplication can be done in 0(n logn)) time for FG-matrices when G is a finite supersolvable
group; this comes from Baum’s Theorem [1] which states that every supersolvable finite group has a
DFT (Discrete Fourier Transform) algorithm running in O(n log n) time. This more general notion is
not discussed further here
8.2 Rank and nullity
Knowledge of a singular matrix and a product of this singular matrix by a non-singular matrix does
not lead to knowledge of the non-singular matrix. It is desirable that the kernel of the singular matrix
be relatively large. The nullity of an n × n matrix with At = 0 is greater than or equal to n
t
; see
Corollary 8.1 below. For large n and relatively small t a solution of a system of equations as AX = B,
with X as indeterminates or xA = b with indeterminates x then has many possible solutions. If A
has (relatively) small rank then so does AY and Y A for any Y as Y A ≤ min{rankX, rankA} and
AY ≤ min{rank, Y, rankA}.
Lemma 8.1 Let A be an n× n matrix such that At = 0. Then rankA ≤ n(t−1)
t
.
Proof: Note first that for n× n matrices rankPQ ≥ rankP + rankQ− n.
Suppose then rankA > n(t−1)
t
. We now show by induction that rankAr > n(t−r)
t
for 1 ≤ r ≤ t.
The case r = 1 is part of the hypothesis. Suppose then rankAk > n(n−k)
t
for 1 ≤ k < t. Hence
rankAk+1 = rankAAk ≥ rankA+ rankAk − n > n(t−1)
t
+ n(t−k)
t
− n = n(t−(k+1))
t
as required.
Now AAt−1 = 0 implies that At−1 ⊆ kerA and so rankAt−1 ≤ dimkerA. But rankA+dim kerA = n
implies dimkerA = n − rankA = n − n(t−1)
t
= n
t
and so rankAt−1 ≤ n
t
. However letting r = t − 1 in
rankAr > n(t−r)
t
implies rankAt−1 > n
t
which is a contradiction. Hence rankA ≤ n(t−1)
t
. 
Corollary 8.1 Suppose At = 0 for an n× n matrix. Then dimkerA ≥ n
t
.
Proof: This follows from the Lemma since rank+dimker = n. 
The following may also be shown but is not relevant here:
Lemma 8.2 Suppose A is an n× n matrix with At = 0. Suppose also rankA = n(t−1)
t
. (This is largest
it can be by Lemma 8.1.). Then rankAt−1 = n
t
. In particular this implies At−1 6= 0.
8.3 RG-matrices
An RG-matrix is a matrix corresponding to a group ring element in the isomorphism from the group
ring into the ring of Rn×n matrices, see for example [5]. Specifically suppose w =
n∑
i=1
αgigi ∈ RG where
G = {g1, g2, . . . , gn} is a listing of the elements of G. The RG-matrix of w denoted by M(RG,w) is
defined as follows:

αg−1
1
g1
αg−1
1
g2
αg−1
1
g3
. . . αg−1
1
gn
αg−1
2
g1
αg−1
2
g2
αg−1
2
g3
. . . αg−1
2
gn
...
...
...
...
...
αg−1n g1 αg−1n g2 αg−1n g3 . . . αg−1n gn


The matrix is in Rn×n and depends on the listing of the elements. Changing the listing changes the
matrix; if A,B are RG-matrices for the element w ∈ RG relative to different listings then B may be
obtained from A by a sequence of [interchanging two rows and then interchanging the corresponding two
columns].
Given the entries of the first row of an RG-matrix, and a listing, the entries of the other rows are
determined from the multiplication of the elements of G and each row and each column is a permutation
of the first row.
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Theorem 8.1 Given a listing of the elements of a group G of order n there is a bijective ring homo-
morphism between RG and the n × n RG-matrices. This bijective ring homomorphism is given by
σ : w 7→M(RG,w).
An RG-matrix for a cyclic group G is a circulant matrix; an RG-matrix when G is a dihedral group
is one of the form ( A BB A ) (in a natural listing of the elements of G), where A is circulant and B is reverse
circulant.
For w ∈ RG the corresponding capital letter W denotes the image of w in the ring of Rn×n matrices,
relative of course to a particular listing of the elements of G. For a vector x ∈ Rn and a fixed listing
of a group G by convention the capital letter X , without underlining, denotes the completion of x. Say
w ∈ RG is singular if and only if W ∈ Rn×n is a singular matrix and w is non-singular if and only if W
is a non-singular matrix. Thus when R is a field w is singular if and only if w is a zero-divisor in RG,
and w is non-singular if and only if w is a unit in RG, [5].
8.4 Commuting matrices
Matrices that commute with one another include group ring matrices corresponding to group rings of
abelian groups. Convenient such group ring matrices include:
1. Circulant matrices over any field; in particular circulant matrices over finite fields such as Zp for p
a prime.
2. RG-matrices from RG = Z2C
n
2 . An element w =
∑2n−1
i=0 αiai is invertible if and only if
∑2n−1
i=0 αi =
1, that is, if and only if there are an odd number of non-zero coefficients in w. For say n = 1024
there are 21023 such invertible elements and 21023 elements whose square is zero.
3. Matrices from ZpC
n
p . Let w =
∑pn−1
i=0 αiai ∈ ZpC
n
p , with αi ∈ Zp, ai ∈ C
n
p . Since w
p =
∑
αi, it
follows that w is invertible if and only if
∑pn−1
i=0 αi 6= 0. If this sum s =
∑
αi is zero then w is a
zero-divisor with wp = 0 and if this sum s 6= 0 then w−1 = s−1wp−1.
For say n = 102 there are p101(p− 1) such invertible elements and p101− 1 such non-zero elements
which are zero-divisors satisfying wp = 0. It is easy to choose randomly an invertible element
whose inverse is easy to construct or a zero-divisor element with relatively small power equal to
zero.
The types of matrices used for the designs and for the transmissions of vectors need not be the same.
8.5 Construction methods
For our constructions it is required to randomly choose, from a large available pool, matrices and vectors
of the following types:
• Singular matrices A with large kernel.
• Non-singular matrices A such that the inverse of A is easy to compute;
• Vectors x, y such that X,Y have large kernels and a combination of X,Y with a known element or
known elements is non-singular, the inverse of which is easy to obtain.
Further:
• Given data x it is required to construct x from which x may directly be obtained and for which
the completion of x is singular with large kernel.
Here we show how such constructions may be obtained in various group ring matrices.
13
8.5.1 In Z2C
n
2
Consider Z2C
n
2 . An element w =
∑2n−1
i=0 αiai ∈ Z2C
n
2 satisfies w
2 =
∑2n−1
i=0 αi and so w
2 = 0 or w2 = 1
according to whether the sum of the coefficients of w is even or odd. When the sum is even then w2 = 0
and so indeed w is singular with large kernel by Corollary 8.1. In Z2C
n
2 it is easy to arrange for any
data x that if x2 6= 0 then adding one known element to x ensures the square of the data is zero. When
x2 = 0 then rankX , where x is the completion of x is at most n2 and thus dimkerX ≥
n
2 ; for large n
this ensures dimkerX is large. Thus there are at least 2
n
2 solutions in z to Xz = bT or XZ = P for
unknown matrix Z.
Thus in Z2C
n
2 :
• Random Matrices X may be chosen such that X2 = 0 and so has large kernel;
• Random Matrices A may be chosen such that A2 = 1 and so the inverse is easy to obtain.
• Random x, y may be chosen so that X2 = 0, Y 2 = 0 and then both X,Y are singular with large
kernel. Combinations such as X + Y + 1, X + Y +H where h ∈ Cn2 and X + Y + w where w has
an odd number of non-zero terms have their squares equal to 1.
• If x is any vector considered in ZCn2 then either X
2 = 0 and has large kernel or else adding an
element h of Cn2 (h could be the identity) ensures (X + H)
2 = 0, or more generally adding an
element w with an odd number of non-zero terms ensures (X +W )2 = 1.
For any ring R, an RC2 matrix is one of the form
(
α β
β α
)
with α, β ∈ R. An RCn2 matrix for n ≥ 2 is
one of the form
(
An−1 Bn−1
Bn−1 An−1
)
where An−1, Bn−1 are RC
n−1
2 -matrices. An RC
n
2 -matrix is completely
determined by its first row as is any RG-matrix.
Any RCn2 -matrix is diagonalised by the Walsh-Hadamard 2
n× 2n matrix which is defined as follows.
The Walsh-Hadamard 2×2 matrix is W2 =
(
1 1
1 −1
)
and for n ≥ 2 the Walsh-Hadamard 2n×2n matrix is
W2n =
(
W2n−1 W2n−1
W2n−1 −W2n−1
)
=W2⊗W2n−1 where ⊗ denotes tensor product. It is known that the Walsh-
Hadamard transformation can be performed in time O(m logm) (m = 2n) and thus vector and matrix
operations with RCn2 -matrices can be done in O(m logm) time. Thus using Z2C
n
2 the constructions may
be done in O(m logm) time using Walsh-Hadamard transformations.
8.5.2 In ZpC
n
p
Consider now the data x = (α0, α1, . . . , αpn−1) to be in ZpC
n
p , that is x =
pn−1∑
i=0
αigi where
{g0, g1, . . . , gpn−1} are the elements of Z
n
p and αi ∈ Zp. Each gi satisfies g
p
i = 1. Then x
p =
pn−1∑
i=0
α
p
i =
pn−1∑
i=0
αi = ǫ(x) where ǫ(x) denotes the augmentation of x. If ǫ(x) = 0 then x
p = 0. If ǫ(x) 6= 0 then
(x − ǫ(x)g)p = 0 for any g ∈ Cnp . More generally (x +
∑
j∈J bjgj)
p = 0 when
∑
j∈J bj = −ǫ(x) for
J ⊂ {0, 1, . . . , pn − 1}.
Thus it is easily arranged for the data x to satisfy xp = 0 by adding a known element or known
elements as necessary. If now xp = 0 then the completion X of x has dimkerX ≥ n
p
. Hence any system
of equations Xz = b for unknown z has p
n
p solutions.
In Cnp every element has order p so w =
∑2n−1
i=0 αigi ∈ ZpC
n
p satisfies w
p =
∑2n−1
i=0 α. When w
p 6= 0
then wp = ǫ(w) 6= 0 and the inverse of w is easy to obtain.
Thus in ZpC
n
p :
• Random matrices X may be chosen such that Xp = 0 and so X has large kernel.
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• Random matrices A may be chosen such that Ap = αI for a scalar α and hence the inverse of A is
easily obtained.
• It is possible to randomly choose X,Y so that Xp = 0, Y p = 0 and so X,Y have large kernel and
(X + Y + 1)p or (X + Y +H)p with h ∈ Cnp or (X + Y +W )
p for various w ∈ Cnp to have value
αI for a scalar α.
• If x is any vector considered in ZpC
n
p then either X
p = 0 or else (X + H)p = I for any h ∈ Cnp ;
more generally Xp = 0 or (X +W )p = 0 for ǫ(w) = −ǫ(x).
A generalised Walsh-Hadamard matrix WH(pn) is defined as follows. WH(p) = Fp where Fp is the
Fourier p × p matrix and WH(pn) = WH(p) ⊗WH(pn−1) for n ≥ 2 where ⊗ denotes tensor product.
This diagonalises any RCnp -matrix when the Fourier matrix exists. Using generalised Walsh-Hadamard
matrices computations in ZpC
n
p can be done in O(m logm) time, m = p
n.
8.5.3 With circulants
Suppose circulant matrices derived from Z2Cn are used where n = 2m is large. Let Cn be generated
by a. Let J ⊂ {0, 1, . . . ,m} be chosen randomly. Now w = (
∑
j∈J (a
j + am+j)) + am satisfies w2 =
(
∑
j∈J (a
2j+a2m+2j))+a2m = (
∑
j∈J (a
2j+a2j))+1 = 1. (One could also use w = (
∑
j∈J (a
j+am+j))+1.)
The circulant matrix W which is the completion of w satisfies W 2 = 1. The number of choices for such
J is of order 2m. Then A,B above can then be constructed from choices of J .
Consider ZpCpn where Cpn is generated by a. It is easy to build singular elements w with w
p = 0.
Now (ai + (p − 1)ai+n)p = ai + (p − 1)ai = 0 and also (ai + ai+n + . . . + ai+(p−1)n)p = 0 and other
similar constructions. Taking a sum of such types gives an element w with wp = 0 whose completion is
a singular element with dim ker ≥ n
p
.
Matrix and vector multiplication for circulant matrices (RG-matrices for G cyclic) can be done with
fast Fourier transform and so can be done in O(n log n) time.
Thus in ZpCpm random matrices may be chosen as follows:
• Random matrices X such that Xp = 0 and so X has large kernel.
• Random matrices A such that Ap = αI for a scalar α and hence the inverse of A is easily obtained.
• It is possible to randomly choose X,Y so that Xp = 0, Y p = 0 and so X,Y have large kernel and
(X + Y + 1)p or (X + Y +H)p with h ∈ Cnp or (X + Y +W )
p for various w ∈ Cnp to have value
αI for a scalar α.
Given data x = (α0, α1, . . . , αm−1) of length m we need this to be considered in a cyclic group ring
so that its completion is singular of large kernel.
Let αi ∈ Z2. Consider the group ring Z2C2m where g generates C2m and let x =
∑m−1
i=0 αig
i +∑2m−1
i=0 αig
i+m. (Yes, gi and gi+m have the same coefficient.) Then x2 = 0 and clearly x is embedded
in x and the completion of x has large kernel.
Let αi ∈ Zp. Consider the group ring ZpCpm and suppose Cpm is generated by g. Consider x =∑m−1
i=0 αig
i −
∑m−1
i=0 αig
i+p. Then xp = 0 and x is embedded in x.
8.5.4 Achieving properties for matrices of general group rings
For properties of group rings and related algebra consult [10]. The augmentation mapping ǫ : RG→ R is
the ring homomorphism given by ǫ(
∑
g∈G
αgg) =
∑
g∈G
αg. Let R be a field Suppose now w is non-singular.
Then ǫ(w) is a unit of F and so is non-zero. Then w′ = w − ǫ(w)1g or w
′ = w − ǫ(w)g for any g ∈ G
satisfies ǫ(w′) = 0 and so w′ is singular. Then W ′ is singular.
Let x1 be 1 × r data considered as an element of a group ring FH where F is a field. If a key has
already been exchanged there is no need to make the pieces of data singular.
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Let G be an r × n generator matrix of a zero-divisor (n, r) code over FH . Then by Proposition 8.2
the completion X of x = x1G has rank at most r. Thus dim kerX ≥ (n−r). Provided r is not very large
then given large n it is impossible to deduce X from AX or XA for an unknown (reasonable) matrix
A. For example the code could have large rate say 34 and then dimkerX ≥
n
4 ; for n large then also
dimkerX is large. This is one way to ensure the data to be transmitted has large kernel and at the same
time enabling error-correcting.
Thus if x is data to be transmitted considered as an element of the group ring RG then x − ǫ(x) is
always a singular element. However this element may have large rank. If this way of ensuring the data
to be transmitted is singular is used then multiple vector design should be used. The data is broken as
(x1, x2, . . . , xr). Then its augmentation is added to each xi to get a vector yi = (xi, ǫ(xi)) which is then
used. So for example (y1A1, y2A2, . . . , yrAr) would be transmitted. Each piece is singular and r is large.
8.6 Complete orthogonal sets of idempotents
Here we consider properties of complete sets of idempotent matrices and ranks of the idempotents.
These are used to construct X,Y such that these have large kernels and linear combinations of which
are non-singular.
Let R be a ring with identity 1R = 1. A complete family of orthogonal idempotents is a set
{e1, e2, . . . , ek} in R such that
(i) ei 6= 0 and e
2
i = ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
(ii) If i 6= j then eiej = 0;
(iii) 1 = e1 + e2 + . . .+ ek.
The idempotent ei is said to be primitive if it cannot be written as ei = e
′
i + e
′′
i where e
′
i, e
′′
i are
idempotents such that e
′
i 6= 0, e
′′
i 6= 0 and e
′
ie
′′
i = 0. A set of idempotents is said to be primitive if each
idempotent in the set is primitive.
For example such sets always exist in FG, the group ring over a field F , when charF 6 | |G|; these
idempotent sets are related to the representation theory of FG, see [10]. General methods for constructing
such sets are derived in [6] and the reader is referred therein for details. The constructions in [6] were
derived in connection with applications to multi-dimensional paraunitary matrices which are used in
the communications’ areas. Specific examples of large sets and using modular arithmetic (working over
GF (p)) and where convolution methods may be applied are given in [7] .
For completeness some of the basics are given below.
Lemma 8.3 Suppose {E1, E2, . . . , Es} is a set of orthogonal idempotent matrices. Then rank(E1+E2+
. . .+ Es) = tr (E1 + E2 + . . .+ Es) = trE1 + trE2 + . . .+ trEs = rankE1 + rankE2 + . . .+ rankEs.
Proof: It is known that rankA = trA for an idempotent matrix, and so rankEi = trEi for each
i. If {E,F,G} is a set an orthogonal idempotent matrices so is {E + F,G}. From this it follows that
rank(E1+E2+. . .+Es) = tr (E1+E2+. . . Es) = trE1+trE2+. . .+trEs = rankE1+rankE2+. . . rankEs.

Corollary 8.2 rank(Ei1 +Ei2 + . . .+Eik) = rankEi1 + rankEi2 + . . .+ rankEik for ij ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s},
and ij 6= il for j 6= l.
Let {e1, e2, . . . , ek} be a complete orthogonal set of idempotents in a vector space over F .
Lemma 8.4 Let w = α1e1 + α2e2 + . . . + αkek with αi ∈ F . Then w is invertible if and only if each
αi 6= 0 and in this case w
−1 = α1
−1e1 + α2
−1e2 + . . .+ αk
−1ek.
Proof: Suppose each αi 6= 0. Then w(α0
−1e0 + α1
−1e1 + . . . + αk
−1ek) = e
2
0 + e
2
1 + . . . + e
2
k =
e0 + e1 + . . .+ ek = 1.
Suppose on the other hand w is invertible and that some αi = 0. Then wei = 0 and so w is a
(non-zero) zero-divisor and is not invertible. 
Now specialise the ei to be n× n matrices and in this case use capital letters and let ei = Ei.
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Lemma 8.5 Let {E1, E2, . . . , Ek} be a complete orthogonal set of idempotents in Fn×n and define A =
a1E1 + a2E2 + . . . + akEk. Then A is invertible if and only if each ai 6= 0 and in this case A
−1 =
a1
−1E1 + a2
−1E2 + . . .+ ak
−1Ek.
The reader may consult [6] for a proof of the following.
Proposition 8.1 Suppose {E1, E2, . . . , Ek} is a complete symmetric orthogonal set of idempotents in
Fn×n. Let A = a1E1 + a2E2 + . . . + akEk with ai ∈ F . Then the determinant of A is |A| =
arankE11 a
rankE2
2 . . . a
rankEk
k .
Lemma 8.6 Let {E0, E1, E2, . . . , En−1} be a complete orthogonal set of idempotents in Fn×n where
each Ei has rank 1. Let I = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and J ⊂ I. Define X =
∑
j∈J
αjEj with αj 6= 0. Then
rankX = |J |.
Proof: Let W = X +
∑
j∈(I−J)
Ej . Then by Lemma 8.5 W is invertible and so has rankn. Hence
n = rank(W ) = rank(X +
∑
j∈(I−J)
Ej) ≤ rankX + rank
∑
j∈(I−J)
Ej = rankX + (n − |J |), by Corollary
8.2. Therefore rankX ≥ |J |. From the rank inequality rank(AB) ≥ rankA + rankB − n, get 0 ≥
rankX + rank
∑
j∈(I−J)
Ej − n = rankX + n− |J | − n and hence |J | ≥ rankX . Thus rankX = |J | 
The following Lemma may be proved similarly.
Lemma 8.7 Let {E0, E1, E2, . . . , Ek} be a complete orthogonal set of idempotents in Fn×n where rankEi =
ri. Let I = {0, 1, . . . , k} and J ⊂ I. Define X =
∑
j∈J
αjEj with αj 6= 0. Then rankX =
∑
j∈J rankEj.
This enables the construction of public keys as follows.
Let {E0, E1, . . . , En−1} be a complete orthogonal set of idempotents in Fn×n and I = {0, 1, . . . , n−1}.
1. A chooses J ⊂ I with |J | approximately half of |I| = n and constructs X =
∑
j∈J
αjEj , Y =
∑
j∈(I−J)
βjEJ with αj 6= 0, βj 6= 0. It is enough to choose J so that both X,Y have large kernel.
2. A chooses {A1, A2} non-singular and calculates {XA1, Y A2}.
3. A has public key (XA1, Y A2) and private key (X,Y,A1, A2).
More generally, proceed as follows to construct a public key for A.
Let {E0, E1, . . . , Ek} be a complete orthogonal set of idempotents in Fn×n and I = {0, 1, . . . , k}.
1. A chooses J ⊂ I and constructs X =
∑
j∈J
αjEj , Y =
∑
j∈(I−J)
βjEj with αj 6= 0, βj 6= 0. Then
rankX =
∑
j∈J rankEj and rankY =
∑
j∈(I−J) EJ = n − rankX and J needs to be chosen so
that both X,Y have large kernel.
2. A chooses {A1, A2} non-singular and calculates {XA1, Y A2}.
3. A has public key (XA1, Y A2) and private key (X,Y,A1, A2).
When B wishes to communicate z to A, the process is as follows.
1. B transmits zXA1, zY A2.
2. A works out zX, zY and then z(X + Y ).
3. Now X + Y is invertible by Lemma 8.5 and easy to calculate and A works out z.
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For each n there are many different complete orthogonal sets of idempotents in Fn×n. It is not
necessary that the particular set used by A in constructing her public key be known to the world so in
fact an additional step (before 1. ) in constructing public key could be:
0. A chooses a complete orthogonal set of idempotents {E0, E1, . . . , Ek} in Fn×n.
Schemes where X,Y obtained from orthogonal sets of idempotents as above are ‘protected’ on both
sides, as explained in section 4, may also be implemented; details are omitted.
8.7 Convolution
Let z ∗ w denote the (circulant) convolution of z and w. Let A be a circulant matrix with first row a.
Lemma 8.8 xA = x ∗ a.
Proof: Let X be the completion of x. Then XA is a circulant matrix whose first row is xA and is also
x ∗ a. 
More general G convolutions may be defined as follows. Let x ∈ Rn, y ∈ Rn and G a finite
group of order n. Define the G-convolution of x and y, denoted x ∗G y, as follows. Suppose x =
(α0, α1, . . . , αn−1), y = (β0, β1, . . . , βn−1) with αi, βi ∈ R and G = {g0, g1, . . . , gn−1}. Let x = α0g0 +
α1g1+ . . .+αn−1gn−1, y = β0g0+β1g1+ . . .+βn−1gn−1. Then x ∈ RG, y ∈ RG and xy = γ0g0+ γ1g1+
. . .+ γn−1gn−1 for some γi ∈ R. Define x ∗G y = (γ0, γ1, . . . , γn−1).
Lemma 8.9 Let A be an RG-matrix with first row a and x ∈ Rn. Then xA = x ∗G a.
Proof: Let X be the completion of x in RG. Then XA is an RG-matrix whose first row is both xA and
x ∗G a. 
When G is the cyclic group generated by g, with listing {1, g, g2, . . . , gn−1}, then z ∗G w is the
normal (circulant) convolution. Calculations in the cyclic group ring and with circulant matrices may be
performed in O(n log n) time using a fast Fourier transform (FFT) and FTs allow an effective parallel
implementation.
The encryption methods of the previous sections which involve multiplying vectors and matrices can
be done in O(n logn) time when the matrices have a structure such as the structure of certain group
ring matrices.
8.8 Coding aspects theory
Suppose data x1 of size 1 × r is to be transmitted. Encode x1 by x1G = x where G is r × n generator
matrix of an (n, r) code with G of rank r. If G is an n×n circulant matrix of rank r then the first r rows
of G are linearly independent; this follows from for the following:
Lemma 8.10 Let G1 be a circulant n× n matrix of rank r and suppose G consists of the first r rows of
G1. Let x = x1G where x1 is a vector of size 1× r and let X be the completion of x. Then rankX ≤ r.
Proof: Let x1 = (α1, α2, . . . , αr). Then x = x1G = (α1, α2, . . . , αr, 0, 0, . . . , 0)G1 where there are
(n− r) zeros. Then X = ΓG1 where Γ is the completion of (α1, α2, . . . , αr, 0, 0, . . . , 0). Hence rankX ≤
rankG1 = r as required. 
Lemma 8.11 Let G be the generator r×n matrix of a cyclic zero-divisor (n, r) code and x = x1G where
x1 has size 1× r. Then the completion X of x has rank ≤ r.
Proof: Let the rows of G be denoted by {vˆ1, vˆ2, . . . , vˆr}. Then x1G =
r∑
i=1
αivˆi. Let Gˆ be the circulant
matrix from which G is derived and let the rows of this be denoted by v1, v2, . . . , vn. The first r rows
of Gˆ are linearly independent, see [8], and thus vˆi =
r∑
i=1
βivi for some βi. Hence x = x1G =
∑
γivi for
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some γi. Thus x = x1G = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γr, 0, 0, . . . , 0)Gˆ where γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γr, 0, 0, . . . , 0) has length n.
Hence X = ΓGˆ where X is the completion of x and Γ is the completion of γ. As rank Gˆ = r this implies
that rankX ≤ r. 
More generally we obtain the following result.
Proposition 8.2 Let G be a rank r generator r×n matrix of a zero-divisor (n, r) code obtained from a
group ring n× n matrix Gˆ of rank r. Then the completion of x1G in this group ring has rank ≤ r.
Proof: Let the rows of G be {v1, v2, . . . , vr} and the rows of Gˆ be {w1, w2, . . . , wn}. Now Gˆ has rank r
and let {wj |y ∈ J} for J ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of r linearly independent rows of Gˆ.
Now x1G =
r∑
i=1
αivi and vi =
∑
j∈J
βi,jwj . Hence x1G =
∑
j∈J
δjwj . Define for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, γi = δi
when i ∈ J and γi = 0 when i 6∈ J . Then x1G = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γn)


w1
w2
...
wn

 = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γn)Gˆ. Hence
X = ΓGˆ where X is the completion of x1G and Γ is the completion of (γ1, γ2, . . . , γn). As rank Gˆ = r
this implies rankX ≤ r. 
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